a zahalka@fme.vutbr.cz, b bradac@fme.vutbr.cz, c tuma.j@fme.vutbr.cz, d synek@fme.vutbr.cz Abstract. Safety is currently a widely discussed topic in the design and construction of machine tools. Similarly important is the area of functional safety. This article focuses on determining the mean time to dangerous failure and diagnostic coverage in safety function of machine tools. Legislative requirements (2006/42/EC [1]) and requirements of current standards (EN ISO 12100 [2], EN ISO 13849-1 [3], EN 62061 [4]) are discussed. The current state of calculating the mean time to dangerous failure and diagnostic coverage and the shortcomings of current approach is presented. A new methodology for determining of mean time to dangerous failure and diagnostic coverage is outlined.
Introduction
Safety is a globally widespread issue being currently under discussion. The functional safety is part of the overall safety that depends on the E/E/PE systems, i.e. electrical, electronic and programmable electronic systems. These systems consist of components such as two-hand controls, emergency stop buttons, motion sensors, PLCs, control systems, safety relays, contactors, etc. The area of functional safety is important from the perspective of protection of worker's health, the environment and property protection and we are also committed to comply with the valid EU legislation. Legislative documents and technical standards provide support and guidance for manufacturers of machine tools how to ensure and assess functional safety. However as shown below, neither of these technical documents can provide a hundred percent support; when solving these issues there appear to be gaps in their interpretation. This article is devoted to these gaps and suggests guidelines how these issues can be solved.
Legislative requirements on functional safety
As mentioned earlier, functional safety is regulated by obligatory legal and technical documents. For functional safety, the most relevant technical standards are those of type B (these standards deal with individual aspects of safety) EN ISO 13849-1 [3] , and EN 62061 [4] . According to these documents, each safety function must reach a certain level of functional safety. Pursuant to EN ISO 13849-1 [3] , the level of functional safety is evaluated by a parameter called Performance Level (PL). According to [3] , the PL discrete level is used to determine the ability of safety-related parts of control systems to perform a safety function in foreseeable conditions. The PL may be up to 5 levels (a, b, c, d and e), pursuant to how the safety function is reliable. The resulting PL is based on the category of safety function involvement, mean time to dangerous failure (MTTF D ), the average diagnostic coverage (DCavg) and resistance to common cause failure (CCF). The procedure and strategies for determination of PL are performed in six basic steps:
Step According to EN 62061 [4] , we can evaluate the level of functional safety pursuant to parameter SIL (Safety Integrity Level). This parameter can take the values from 1 to 3 and, as in the previous case; SIL 1 determines the lowest level of integrity while SIL 3 is the highest level. SIL is determined on the basis of parameters PFH D (Probability of Dangerous Failure per Hour). The procedure and strategies for determination of SIL are also carried out in six steps:
Step -Calculation of SIL for the whole system and comparison with SIL CL.
Current state in determination of Performance Level and Safety Integrity Level
The achieved level of functional safety is therefore dependent on the PL or SIL parameters. In order to better understand the problem; at first it is necessary to show the current approach to determining these two parameters. Table 1 shows on what factors the PL and SIL parameters depend. 
Determination of PL by EN ISO 13849-1 [3]
To determine the final PL for the safety function, it is necessary to set and calculate several parameters. For each component of the safety function, it is necessary to establish its basic parameters, either parameter B 10D or PFH D . These parameters can be usually obtained directly from the manufacturer. In practice, for electromechanical components, such as contactors, relays, various switches or buttons, the manufacturer usually specifies the B 10D; i.e. the number of operating cycles after which 10 percent of population of component will have failed dangerously. For components like PLCs, motor modules, I/O modules, CNC controllers, the manufacturer generally specifies directly PFH D .
In case of common electromechanical component, when the manufacturer specified value B 10D , the following formula is used to calculate MTTF D : 
Where: n op is the number of operating cycles per year, d op is mean operating time in days per year, h op is mean operating time in hours per day, t cycle is time between two consecutive cycles.
If the component PFH D is given by the manufacturer, we obtain the value of MTTF D from the following formula:
Where: MTTF D is mean time to dangerous failure, PFH D is probability of dangerous failure per hour, 8760 is the number of hours per year.
As the safety function is composed of more components, PL of the entire function is determined by the formula 4:
Where: MTTF D1…n is mean time to dangerous failure for each component in safety function.
To determine the performance level, it is also necessary to set the entire diagnostic coverage (DC). This is the extent of diagnostic efficiency, which is calculated as a fraction of the failure rate of detected dangerous failures and the failure rate of all dangerous failures. The total average diagnostic coverage is calculated according to the formula 5: 
Engineering Mechanics 2015
Determination of SIL by EN 62061 [4] Similarly to the previous approach according to [3] , also in this case it is necessary to calculate several partial values for determining the final SIL. In the beginning the manufacturer will again provide us with the same information; i.e. B 10D or PFH D . If the manufacturer indicates PFH D, it is all what we need. If we are given B 10D only , we use the following formula: 
Formulation of the issue with determining of MTTF D and DC in safety function
As already indicated in the introduction, in functional safety standards the deficiencies can be found; these lead to different results of analyses of functional safety. Therefore the results show a great deal of diversity. Let us consider the following specific case. We will evaluate a safety emergency stop function according to EN ISO 13849-1 [3] and from the analysis we will obtain the values shown in Table 2 . The required parameter PLr (Required Performance Level) will be "d" for this safety function. We can use Fig. 5 of EN SO 13849-1 [3] for evaluation. From the graph in Fig. 1 we can see that we obtain the PLd that satisfies the value for our safety function. 
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If we use table 7 of EN ISO 13849-1 [3] for evaluation, we obtain PLc (Table 3) ; the requirement for PLr is not satisfied and the safety function would have to be further improved. If the same standard EN ISO 13849-1 [3] is used with the table in Annex K.1, it can be seen that the PLd is reached using the same input parameters (Table 4 ). To evaluate the results of the functional safety analysis of the machine equipment, e.g. SISTEMA software can also be used. It takes advantage of an improved method for obtaining the final value of PL compared to Tab. 7, Fig.  5 and Tab. K. 1 in EN ISO 13849-1 [3] . In this case, PLd is provided in SISTEMA software; i.e. the PLr value is also satisfied. However with other parameters completely opposite results can be achieved. There is a considerable number of combinations of input parameters for assessment of safety function and based on different approaches, we may obtain different results. Another important problem in the current methodology for determining the level of functional safety is counting of cycles of individual components, which are also active in a number of safety functions. In the construction of the current machine tools, we nearly always find the components that carry out more of these functions at a time; i.e. one component performs e.g. 3200 cycles per year in one particular safety function. A reliability level of this safety function is therefore calculated on the basis of this number of operating cycles. Calculation is carried out as if there was only this particular safety function on the machine. However, the same component can also be found in another safety function, which performs e.g. 6400 cycles per year and as the case may be, in another different function performing 3200 cycles. These are again calculated only with the number of cycles concerning the particular function. The fact that these functions can interact is not included at all. It is obvious that these numbers of operating cycles must be summed up since one particular component performs in these three functions in total 12800 operating cycles per year. The mean time to dangerous failure is therefore shortened (see equation 1), and so is the mean time to dangerous failure of all three safety functions, in which the component occurs. This reduction of total MTTF D is not insignificant. In practice, the average of the summation of operating cycles leads to a reduction of MTTF D by 20 years. Taking into account that low MTTF D is from 0 to 10 years and the mean MTTF D from 10 to 30 years, we can easily get into a situation where the overall
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Engineering Mechanics 2015 reliability drops to a level not enabling us to comply with legislative requirements. Similarly to MTTF D , these issues also affect the calculation of diagnostic coverage (DC), which can be calculated according to equation 5. As it can be seen, the equation for calculating the diagnostic coverage also considers MTTF D of individual components of the safety function. Thus, if MTTF D is reduced, the average diagnostic coverage will also fall.
Summary
The above text refers to and describes two different issues that have a significant impact on the accuracy and consistency of evaluation of the level of functional safety of safety functions implemented in machine tools. The first problem is the quantity and inconsistency of methods which could be used to evaluate the resulting level of functional safety. Thus, the manufacturers can virtually choose their own method of final evaluation, which will ensure that the implemented safety function will meet legislative requirements. These different approaches are four in total. EN ISO 13849-1 standard [3] offers three approaches (Fig. 5 , Tab. 7 and Tab. K. 1); the fourth approach is provided by SISTEMA software, which, according to its developers, offers "refined analysis method for the performance level" [5] . Here, according to our opinion, the individual approaches should certainly be unified to avoid the ambiguities in their interpretation.
Another problem described in this article touches upon the actual determination of MTTF D for each safety function as one of the important parameters for obtaining the final PL. Here the current legislation is "benevolent" and allows the evaluation of each safety function separately. It also, among others, allows achieving of significantly better results of the respective analyses. How to deal with this ambiguity is proposed in the following solutions. At the beginning of each analysis of functional safety of the machine tool it is necessary to perform an inventory of all the components implementing safety functions. This is followed by the selection of all components that perform simultaneously more functions and the sum of their working cycles from all safety functions is calculated; using a classical method, this resulting sum serves for calculating the resulting PLs. It is supposed that only this method can ensure a correct determination of PL.
